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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellee Sergey Aleynikov is a computer programmer 
who worked at Goldman, Sachs & Co. (“GSCo”) from 2007 
through 2009 and held the title of vice president.  After 
accepting an employment offer from another company, 
Aleynikov copied source code developed at GSCo into 
computer files and transferred them out of GSCo.  He was 
indicted by a federal grand jury and convicted of violations of 
the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2314, and the 
Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1832.  The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed his 
conviction, concluding that his conduct did not violate federal 
law.  He was then indicted by a New York grand jury for 
violations of New York law and this criminal case remains 
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pending. 
 Aleynikov brought this suit in the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey seeking 
indemnification and advancement for his attorney’s fees from 
Appellant the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. (“GS Group,” and 
together with GSCo, “Goldman”).  He seeks indemnification 
for attorney’s fees expended in defending against the federal 
criminal charges and advancement of attorney’s fees for the 
state criminal charges, along with “fees on fees” incurred in 
obtaining indemnification and advancement.  He claims his 
right to indemnification and advancement under a portion of 
GS Group’s By-Laws that applies to non-corporate 
subsidiaries like GSCo, providing for indemnification and 
advancement to, among others, officers of GSCo.  Following 
expedited discovery in aid of defining the term officer, the 
District Court granted summary judgment in Aleynikov’s 
favor on his claim for advancement but denied it on his claim 
for indemnification and denied Goldman’s cross-motion for 
summary judgment.  Goldman appealed.   
 We are asked to interpret the meaning of the term 
officer in GS Group’s By-Laws and determine whether 
Aleynikov is entitled to indemnification and advancement due 
to his title of vice president.  We conclude that the term 
officer is ambiguous and that the relevant extrinsic evidence 
raises genuine issues of material fact precluding summary 
judgment.  We therefore vacate the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in Aleynikov’s favor on the advancement 
issue.  While we exercise supplemental appellate jurisdiction 
over the District Court’s denial of Goldman’s cross-motion 
for summary judgment, as urged by Goldman, we affirm the 
District Court’s denial of summary judgment in Goldman’s 
favor. 
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I. 
A. 
 GS Group is a corporation organized under the laws of 
the state of Delaware.  GSCo is a New York limited 
partnership and non-corporate subsidiary of GS Group.  
Section 6.4 of GS Group’s By-Laws addresses 
indemnification for and advancement of legal fees and costs 
for, among others, officers of GS Group and officers of GS 
Group’s corporate and non-corporate subsidiaries including 
GSCo.  This Section provides that for non-corporate 
subsidiaries, “the term ‘officer,’ . . . shall include in addition 
to any officer of such entity, any person serving in a similar 
capacity or as the manager of such entity.”  App. 118. 
 As a limited partnership and non-corporate subsidiary 
of GS Group, GSCo is not required to have officers.  GSCo 
has appointed officers pursuant to a written resolution 
process, but this process was not widely disseminated.  It has 
no other formal appointment processes for officers.  GSCo 
employs tens of thousands of employees.  Approximately 
one-third of those employees hold the title of vice president.  
Someone with the title of vice president is more senior than 
someone with the title of analyst or associate, but less senior 
than someone with the title of managing director. 
 Aleynikov worked as a computer programmer for 
GSCo from May 7, 2007 until June 30, 2009, although his 
last day in the office was June 5, 2009.  While at GSCo, he 
developed source code for Goldman’s high-frequency trading 
system and held the title of vice president in GSCo’s equities 
division.  He did not supervise other employees or transact 
business on behalf of GSCo.  He exercised no management or 
leadership responsibilities.  As a part his employment, 
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Aleynikov agreed to keep all proprietary information 
belonging to GSCo confidential.   
 In late April 2009, Aleynikov accepted an employment 
offer from Teza Technologies, a startup company in the high-
frequency trading business.  On his last day in GSCo’s 
offices, Aleynikov copied GSCo’s source code into computer 
files and transferred those files to a server in Germany.  On 
July 1, 2009, Goldman contacted federal law-enforcement 
authorities to report the transfer of the files.  Two days later, 
FBI agents arrested Aleynikov.   
 Aleynikov was indicted by a federal grand jury in the 
Southern District of New York in February of 2010.  He 
moved to dismiss all three counts against him; the District 
Court granted his motion as to one but denied it as to the 
other two counts.  He proceeded to trial on the two counts:  
(1) a violation of the National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2314; and (2) a violation of the Economic Espionage Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1832.  Following an eight-day trial in the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New York, a 
jury found Aleynikov guilty on both counts.  He was 
sentenced to 97 months of imprisonment. 
 Aleynikov served 51 weeks in prison while his appeal 
was pending.  On February 16, 2012, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed his conviction and 
ordered him acquitted and released immediately, concluding 
that his conduct did not violate federal law.  See United States 
v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 On August 2, 2012, New York state authorities 
arrested Aleynikov and charged him with state crimes based 
upon the same alleged conduct.  On September 26, 2012, a 
New York grand jury indicted him on two charges: (1) 
unlawful use of secret scientific material in violation of N.Y. 
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Penal Law § 165.07; and (2) unlawful duplication of 
computer-related material in violation of N.Y. Penal Law 
§ 156.30(1).  The state criminal case remains pending.   
 On August 24, 2012, Aleynikov and his counsel sent a 
letter to Goldman seeking indemnification for over $2.3 
million in attorney’s fees and costs incurred in connection 
with the federal criminal proceedings and advancement of 
attorney’s fees and costs related to the ongoing state criminal 
proceedings.  The letter asserted that Aleynikov was entitled 
to indemnification and advancement under the By-Laws. 
B. 
 On September 25, 2012, Aleynikov initiated this case 
in the United States District Court for the District of New 
Jersey seeking indemnification and advancement, as well as 
“fees on fees” incurred in attempting to obtain 
indemnification and advancement. 
 At the same time, Aleynikov filed a motion for 
summary judgment and requested entry of a preliminary 
injunction.  On December 14, 2012, the District Court denied 
Aleynikov’s summary judgment motion and request for a 
preliminary injunction, concluding that the factual record was 
insufficient to establish Aleynikov’s entitlement to 
indemnification and advancement under the By-Laws.  The 
District Court ordered expedited discovery to establish in the 
record the process for appointing officers and the practice of 
indemnifying employees at GSCo, in order to discover the 
meaning of the term officer in the By-Laws. 
 Following expedited discovery, the parties filed cross-
motions for summary judgment.  On October 16, 2013, the 
District Court granted Aleynikov’s motion for summary 
judgment with respect to his claims for advancement and 
advancement-related fees.  The District Court analyzed 
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Section 6.4 the By-Laws for ambiguity, exploring the plain 
meaning of vice president and concluding that the meaning of 
this term was unambiguous and entitled Aleynikov to 
indemnification and advancement.  It proceeded to consider 
the extrinsic evidence anyway, concluding that the evidence 
submitted did not raise any genuine issues of material fact.  
Finally, the District Court explained that even if there were an 
issue of fact, it would apply the doctrine of contra 
proferentem to construe any ambiguities against Goldman, 
the unilateral-drafter of the By-Laws.  It denied Aleynikov’s 
motion for summary judgment with respect to 
indemnification and indemnification-related fees pending 
further discovery on the total monetary amount due.  The 
District Court also denied Goldman’s cross-motion for 
summary judgment.  Goldman filed a timely notice of appeal 
and sought to stay the District Court’s order pending appeal 
and to expedite the appeal.  This Court denied Goldman’s 
motion for a stay pending appeal, granted its motion to 
expedite the appeal, and referred the additional issue of the 
Court’s appellate jurisdiction to the merits panel.  After oral 
argument, we stayed the District Court’s order pending our 
resolution of this appeal. 
II. 
A. 
 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction over this 
case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  Aleynikov challenges our 
appellate jurisdiction.  Before we turn to the merits of the 
case, “we must first be satisfied that this court has appellate 
jurisdiction.”  Metro Transp. Co. v. North Star Reinsurance 
Co., 912 F.2d 672, 675 (3d Cir. 1990).  “We exercise plenary 
review over all jurisdictional questions.”  Belitskus v. 
Pizzingrilli, 343 F.3d 632, 639 (3d Cir. 2003). 
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 The District Court’s order does not constitute a final 
decision, so it cannot be appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Goldman contends that we have jurisdiction over its appeal of 
the District Court’s order granting summary judgment under 
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), which provides for appellate 
jurisdiction over interlocutory orders that grant injunctive 
relief.  Although the District Court did not use the term 
“injunction” in its order, that is not determinative; we must 
evaluate the nature of the relief granted to determine whether 
the remedy is injunctive.  Cohen v. Bd. of Trustees of the 
Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 867 F.2d 1455, 1466 (3d 
Cir. 1989) (en banc) (“If the order grants part of the relief 
requested by the claimant, the label put on an order by the 
district court does not prevent the appellate tribunal from 
treating it as an injunction for the purposes of section 
1292(a)(1).”).   
 For a district court’s order to be considered an 
injunction for the purposes of § 1292(a)(1), “[t]he order must 
not only adjudicate some of the relief sought in the complaint; 
it must also be of such a nature that if it grants relief it could 
be enforced pendente lite by contempt if necessary.”  Id. at 
1465 (citing Wright, Miller, Cooper & Gressman, Federal 
Practice & Procedure, § 3922, 29 (1977)).  Alternatively, 
“specific enforcement of contractual undertakings by an order 
against the person has been regarded as a classic form of 
equitable relief . . . . and if it is granted the order falls within 
section 1292(a)(1).”  Id. at 1468.  
 The order here adjudicated relief sought in 
Aleynikov’s complaint and appears to be enforceable through 
the District Court’s contempt powers, given the ongoing and 
immediate nature of the obligation and the role that the 
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District Court assumed in overseeing the payments.
1
  
Alternatively, the order could be seen as one for specific 
performance of a contractual duty.  It compels Goldman to 
advance attorney’s fees in order to fulfill its alleged 
contractual obligation under the By-Laws.  The obligation is 
immediate, ongoing, indeterminate, and could be repaid 
depending on the outcome of the state criminal proceeding.  
Under the factors set forth in Cohen, the District Court’s 
order appears to be an immediately appealable injunction. 
 Aleynikov contends that the order merely requires the 
payment of money in an action at law, and is therefore not an 
appealable injunction.  An order is legal if it compels the 
payment of money that is past due or compels specific 
performance of a past due monetary obligation.  Pell v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co. Inc., 539 F.3d 292, 307 (3d Cir. 
2008).  But where an order for the payment of money is 
forward-looking and involves an amount that cannot be 
calculated with specificity, it is equitable.  Id.  Here, the 
District Court’s order is clearly forward-looking and 
                                              
1
 The District Court’s order stated that Goldman was to 
pay Aleynikov’s legal fees and expenses “periodically as they 
are incurred going forward” and appointed a Magistrate Judge 
to “supervise the payment process.”  App. 1.  It ordered that 
Aleynikov and his attorneys should “periodically submit 
copies of their bills and time records in support of periodic 
applications for fees and expenses.”  Id.  And “Goldman will 
be given a reasonable period of time, to be set by the 
Magistrate Judge, to review such submissions and submit any 
objections.”  Id. at 2.  By prescribing the procedure for the 
payments and appointing a Magistrate Judge to oversee that 
process, the District Court assumed a continuing role in 
enforcing its order. 
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indeterminate, as it requires Goldman to pay Aleynikov’s 
attorney’s fees as he incurs them. 
 We hold that the District Court’s order requiring the 
advancement of legal fees is injunctive and therefore 
immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).  We 
join our sister circuits who have concluded the same under 
similar conditions.  See Westar Energy, Inc. v. Lake, 552 F.3d 
1215, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2009) (concluding that an order 
granting an executive advancement was an immediately 
appealable injunction because it required specific 
performance of a contract); Pac. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 
28 F.3d 1093, 1096 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that an order 
directing an insurer to advance legal fees pursuant to an 
insurance policy was an immediately appealable injunction). 
 Goldman also urges us to exercise our pendent 
appellate jurisdiction over the issues raised in its cross-motion 
for summary judgment, which the District Court denied.  
Pendent appellate jurisdiction “allows an appellate court in its 
discretion to exercise jurisdiction over issues that are not 
independently appealable but that are intertwined with issues 
over which the appellate court properly and independently 
exercises its jurisdiction.”  E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d 
187, 202-03 (3d Cir. 2001).  The doctrine is “narrow,” and 
“should be used sparingly, and only where there is sufficient 
overlap in the facts relevant to both the appealable and 
nonappealable issues to warrant plenary review.”  Id. at 203 
(internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted) (quoting In 
re Montgomery Cnty., 215 F.3d 367, 375-76 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
 The appealable order – the District Court’s partial 
grant of summary judgment ordering that Goldman advance 
Aleynikov’s attorney’s fees for his state criminal action – 
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raises the issue of the meaning of officer as used in 
Goldman’s By-Laws and whether the term includes 
Aleynikov.  Goldman’s cross-motion for summary judgment 
also turned on the meaning of the term officer and whether 
Aleynikov could be considered one.  Therefore, our 
adjudication of the issues properly before us would 
necessarily resolve whether Goldman’s cross-motion was 
properly denied.  We would not need to evaluate additional 
facts or legal arguments to resolve Goldman’s cross-motion.  
Because the issues are so intertwined, this is one of the 
relatively rare instances where we should use our discretion to 
exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction.  We will therefore 
reach the issue of whether the District Court erred in denying 
Goldman’s cross-motion for summary judgment; however, as 
we conclude below that the By-Laws are ambiguous and 
genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, 
the District Court did not err in denying Goldman’s motion. 
B. 
 Having satisfied ourselves that we have appellate 
jurisdiction, we turn to the standard of review.  “We review a 
grant of summary judgment de novo, and thus apply the same 
standard as that used by the District Court.”  Am. Eagle 
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Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 584 F.3d 575, 580-81 (3d Cir. 
2009).
2
   
 Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  “An issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient 
evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for 
the non-moving party, and a factual dispute is material only if 
it might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law.”  
Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 
(1986)).  In conducting our review, we view the record in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all 
reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.  Bowers v. NCAA, 
475 F.3d 524, 535 (3d Cir. 2007).  A motion for summary 
judgment is properly denied if “a fair-minded jury could 
return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.”  
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 
III. 
 The propriety of the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment in Aleynikov’s favor hinges on the interpretation of 
                                              
2
 Our review is plenary even though the District 
Court’s grant of summary judgment operated as an injunction.  
Ordinarily we review a district court’s grant of an injunction 
for abuse of discretion.  Bennington Foods LLC v. St. Croix 
Renaissance, Grp., LLP, 528 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2008).  
But where, as here, the injunction results on a summary 
judgment motion, our review is plenary.  See Cureton v. 
NCAA, 198 F.3d 107, 113 (3d Cir. 1999) (exercising plenary 
review over an entry of a permanent injunction on a motion 
for summary judgment). 
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the term officer.  We will begin with a brief overview of 
corporate by-laws and indemnification and advancement 
provisions under Delaware law.
3
  We will then consider 
whether, in the context of Section 6.4 of Goldman’s By-
Laws, the word officer is ambiguous and, if so, whether 
extrinsic evidence can resolve this ambiguity.  
A. 
 Delaware has enacted statutory provisions giving 
corporations and their subsidiaries the ability to provide for 
mandatory indemnification and advancement in their 
corporate charters, by-laws, and other agreements.  Section 
145 of the Delaware Code allows business entities to 
indemnify or provide advancement to an individual involved 
in a lawsuit by reason of fact that he or she is or was a 
director, officer, employee, or agent of the corporation, 
partnership, or other enterprise.  8 Del. Code § 145(a), (e).  
This “allows corporate officials to defend themselves in legal 
proceedings ‘secure in the knowledge that, if vindicated, the 
corporation will bear the expense of litigation.’”  Homestore 
Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 (Del. 2005) (quoting 
VonFeldt v. Stifel Fin. Corp., 714 A.2d 79, 84 (Del. 1998)). 
 Indemnification and advancement are related but 
distinct avenues by which a business entity pays for an 
individual’s legal expenses.  In both, the corporation pays the 
legal expenses of the officer, director, or other employee 
when that individual is accused of wrongdoing in the course 
of performing duties to the corporation.  For indemnification, 
the corporation reimburses the individual for his or her legal 
                                              
3
 The parties agree that this case is governed by 
Delaware law, as GS Group is a corporation organized under 
the laws of the state of Delaware.   
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expenses once he or she has been successful in the underlying 
proceeding on the merits or otherwise.  Homestore, 888 A.2d 
at 211.  For advancement, on the other hand, the corporation 
pays legal expenses on an ongoing basis in advance of the 
final disposition of the lawsuit, provided that the individual 
must repay the amount advanced if it turns out he or she is not 
entitled to be indemnified – i.e., he or she is not successful on 
the merits or otherwise in the underlying lawsuit.  8 Del. 
Code § 145(e).   
 Advancement provides individuals “with immediate 
interim relief from the personal out-of-pocket financial 
burden of paying the significant on-going expenses inevitably 
involved with investigations and legal proceedings.”  
Homestore, 888 A.2d at 211.  Section 145(e) – providing for 
advancement – is permissive, but many corporate charters, 
by-laws, and agreements set forth mandatory advancement 
provisions.  Id. at 212.  The right to advancement survives 
even if the entity from which advancement is sought “is 
alleging that the plaintiff has committed perfidious acts 
against it.”  DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., LLC, No. 1384-N, 
2006 WL 224058, at *11 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2006). 
 The Delaware General Assembly’s enactment of the 
statute promoting advancement “plainly reflect[s] a 
legislative determination to avoid deterring qualified persons 
from accepting responsible positions with financial 
institutions for fear of incurring liabilities greatly in excess of 
their means.”  Ridder v. CityFed Fin. Corp., 47 F.3d 85, 87 
(3d Cir. 1995).  Mandatory advancement provisions are 
“broadly construed” in order to provide individuals entitled to 
advancement with “immediate interim relief.”  Brown v. 
LiveOps, Inc., 903 A.2d 324, 327 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
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B. 
 We turn now to our analysis of the By-Laws.  By-laws 
are interpreted in accordance with “the rules used to interpret 
statutes, contracts, and other written instruments.”  Gentile v. 
SinglePoint Fin., Inc., 788 A.2d 111, 113 (Del. 2001).  The 
terms are given their plain meaning, like terms in any other 
contract.  Activision Blizzard, Inc. v. Hayes, No. 497, 2013 
WL 6053804, at *3 (Del. Nov. 15, 2013).  “To be ambiguous, 
a disputed contract term must be fairly or reasonably 
susceptible to more than one meaning.”  Alta Berkeley VI 
C.V. v. Omneon, Inc., 41 A.3d 381, 385 (Del. 2012).  “[T]he 
fact that the parties offer two different interpretations does not 
create an ambiguity.”  Activision Blizzard, 2013 WL 
6053804, at *3.  We analyze the By-Laws for ambiguity 
“through the lens of ‘what a reasonable person in the position 
of the parties would have thought the [By-Laws] meant.’”  
Kuhn Constr., Inc. v. Diamond State Port Corp., 990 A.2d 
393, 396 (Del. 2010) (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chem. 
Co. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Del. 
1992)).  We begin by inquiring whether the relevant provision 
of Section 6.4 of the By-Laws is unambiguous.  Then, 
concluding that the relevant provision is ambiguous, we look 
beyond the By-Laws to attempt to determine the parties’ 
meaning.  Finally, we consider whether the doctrine of contra 
proferentem properly applies here. 
1. 
 The By-Laws’ use of the term “officer” is crucial to 
the outcome, because a person is entitled to indemnification 
and advancement under the By-Laws if he or she is made a 
party to an action by reason of the fact that he or she “is or 
was a director, officer, trustee, member, stockholder, partner, 
incorporator or liquidator of a Subsidiary of [GS Group].”  
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App. 117.  Aleynikov’s only claim to indemnification and 
advancement rests on whether he is an “officer” of GSCo, a 
subsidiary of GS Group, as he does not, and cannot, claim 
any other entitlement under the By-Laws.   
 For the purposes of indemnification and advancement 
concerning subsidiaries that are not corporations, like GSCo, 
the By-Laws state:  “the term ‘officer’ shall include in 
addition to any officer of such entity, any person serving in a 
similar capacity or as the manager of such entity.”  App. 118.  
Yet, after stating the applicable law on contract interpretation, 
the District Court observed that “the plain and ordinary 
meaning of ‘vice president’ is, of course, the starting point 
and touchstone of the analysis.”  App. 27.  It then proceeded 
to evaluate the dictionary definition and meaning of vice 
president in the case law to conclude that the usual and 
ordinary meaning of vice president is unambiguous and 
means that Aleynikov is an officer.  The District Court’s 
focus of its analysis on the meaning of the term vice 
president, which does not appear at all in Section 6.4 of the 
By-Laws, was its first and most significant error.  The term 
officer appears in the relevant language of the By-Laws, and 
it is the interpretation of the term officer that determines 
whether Aleynikov is entitled to advancement.  In analyzing 
whether vice president is ambiguous, the District Court 
analyzed a term that does not appear in the relevant portion of 
the contract. 
 Having noted this crucial error of interpretation, we 
move to the text of the relevant part of Section 6.4 to 
determine whether it is unambiguous.  At first blush, the 
definition of “officer” with respect to non-corporate 
subsidiaries is fairly circular.  “Officer,” as used in the By-
Laws, includes:  (1) any officer; (2) a person serving in a 
similar capacity; or (3) a person serving as the manager of the 
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non-corporate subsidiary.  We read the first use of “officer” 
as setting forth a contractual category.
4
  It defines “officer” 
for the purposes of entitling a person qualifying under that 
definition to indemnification and advancement.  For this 
reason, this apparent circuity – defining “officer” as including 
any officer – is not problematic in and of itself.  But the 
second use of the word officer in this provision remains 
undefined.  From the face of the instrument, it is not 
immediately apparent what characteristics make someone an 
officer.   
 We look to the dictionary definition of officer for 
“assistance in determining the plain meaning” of this 
undefined term.  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Am. Legacy 
Found., 903 A.2d 728, 738 (Del. 2006).  We look here first 
“because dictionaries are the customary reference source that 
a reasonable person in the position of a party to a contract 
would use to ascertain the ordinary meaning of words not 
defined in the contract.”  Id.  Black’s Law Dictionary defines 
officer as “a person who holds an office of trust, authority, or 
command.”  Black’s Law Dictionary 1193 (9th ed. 2009).  
Merriam Webster defines it similarly.  See Merriam-Webster 
Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2009) (“One who holds an 
office of trust, authority, or command.”).  According to 
American Heritage Dictionary, an officer is “[o]ne who holds 
an office of authority or trust in an organization, such as a 
corporation.”  Am. Heritage Dictionary of the English 
                                              
4
 To avoid confusion, we use “officer,” with quotation 
marks, when referring to the term as used in the first sense – 
the contractual category defining the term for the purposes of 
indemnification and advancement.  We use officer, without 
quotation marks, when discussing the term as used within the 
definition. 
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Language (5th ed. 2013).  Random House College Dictionary 
adds to the definition an element of election or appointment, 
defining officer as “a person appointed or elected to a 
position of responsibility or authority in an organization.”  
Random House Coll. Dictionary (Revised Ed. 1980).   
 We can glean from these definitions that the plain 
meaning of the term officer is someone holding a position of 
trust, authority, or command.  Only one of the four definitions 
suggests that for a person to be considered an officer, he or 
she must be elected or appointed to that position.  We 
therefore conclude that the election or appointment 
requirement cannot properly be considered a part of the 
ordinary, dictionary definition of officer.   
 Equipped with this definition of officer, we consider 
whether the use of this definition gives meaning to the 
provision that “‘officer’ shall include in addition to any 
officer of such entity, any person serving in a similar capacity 
or as the manager of such entity.”  App. 118.  Applying the 
dictionary definition here results in the reading that “officer” 
as a contractual category is defined as someone holding a 
position of trust, authority or command and a person serving 
in a similar capacity.  This reading results in a tautology – 
officer as defined using the dictionary definition and “any 
person serving in a similar capacity” mean the same thing.  
Using the dictionary definition, therefore, does not result in 
an unambiguous provision; rather, what appears at first blush 
to be circular instead becomes repetitive. 
 Goldman suggests that we should read this clause as 
providing that an “officer” for the purposes of 
indemnification and advancement includes:  “general 
purpose, normal-course officers of non-corporate entities,” 
along with people serving in similar capacities and managers.  
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Goldman Br., at 31.  Goldman maintains that at GSCo, these 
“general purpose, normal-course officers” are those, and only 
those, appointed by formal, written resolution of the General 
Partner of GSCo.  This definition is unavailing for several 
reasons.  First of all, there is no generally promulgated 
document stating who such “general purpose, normal-course 
officers” are at GSCo or stating that officers are appointed 
only by written resolution of the General Partner.
5
  Therefore, 
it is not apparent that these “normal-course officers” would be 
readily ascertainable, such that the plain meaning of the term 
officer in the By-Laws would be apparent as applied to 
GSCo.  Second, to read this provision in the way Goldman 
urges – that officers are “general purpose, normal-course 
officers” appointed pursuant to written resolutions of 
Goldman’s General Partner – we would have to violate the 
“well-established principle that in construing a contract a 
court cannot in effect rewrite it or supply omitted provisions.”  
L.Q. v. P.Q., 466 A.2d 1213, 1217 (Del. 1983).  Finally, this 
reading would conflict with the dictionary definition of 
officer – someone holding a position of trust, authority, or 
                                              
5
 We discuss the import of these written resolutions in 
significantly more detail below.  Since we find the provision 
in the By-Laws to be ambiguous, the resolutions may indeed 
be of use in determining what the contract means as to 
officers at GSCo.  But they cannot supply the meaning of the 
term when the By-Laws make no mention of appointment by 
written resolution and Goldman can point to no generally 
promulgated documents identifying officers as appointed only 
by written resolution.  A supplied definition cannot be a 
term’s “plain meaning” if it can be known only to a select few 
in the organization when the readership of the provision is far 
wider than these select few.   
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command.  We therefore decline to adopt Goldman’s reading. 
 If there were a readily-identifiable, industry-specific 
common meaning of the term officer, the application of this 
meaning would perhaps render Section 6.4 of the By-Laws 
unambiguous.  We analyze ambiguity “through the lens of 
‘what a reasonable person in the position of the parties would 
have thought the contract meant.’”  Kuhn Constr., Inc., 990 
A.2d at 396 (quoting Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chem. Co., 616 
A.2d at 1197).  If there were a common meaning of the term 
officer in the non-corporate investment banking industry, 
such that its plain meaning would be apparent from the face 
of the By-Laws to “a reasonable person” in that industry, we 
could apply that meaning and conclude that the provision is 
unambiguous.  But we have not been supplied with such a 
commonly-understood meaning of the term officer.   
 We therefore conclude that the provision of the By-
Laws defining “officers” for the purposes of indemnification 
and advancement at non-corporate subsidiaries as “any officer 
of such entity, [and] any person serving in a similar capacity 
or as the manager of such entity” is ambiguous.  App. 118.  It 
is circuitous, repetitive, and most importantly, “fairly or 
reasonably susceptible to more than one meaning.”  Alta 
Berkeley VI C.V., 41 A.3d at 385.  Officer could mean simply 
someone occupying a position of trust or authority, or it could 
mean someone elected or appointed to that particular position, 
or it could mean something else entirely in the relevant 
industry.  The failure to define the term suggests that it has, or 
was meant to have, some meaning that would be obvious to 
readers of the document.  Unfortunately, we cannot ascertain 
that meaning from the face of the document or by resorting to 
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dictionary definitions.
6
   
 
2. 
 “When the provisions in controversy are fairly 
susceptible of different interpretations or may have two or 
more different meanings, there is ambiguity.  Then the 
interpreting court must look beyond the language of the 
contract to ascertain the parties’ intentions.”  Eagle Indus., 
Inc. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702 A.2d 1228, 1232 
(Del. 1997).  In looking at extrinsic evidence to interpret an 
ambiguous contractual provision, “a court may consider 
evidence of prior agreements and communications of the 
parties as well as trade usage or course of dealing.”  Id. at 
1233. 
 We pause to note that resorting to extrinsic evidence in 
this case is problematic.  Because the By-Laws are a 
unilaterally-drafted agreement – neither Aleynikov nor the 
many other employees of GSCo who would be interested in 
whether they are eligible for indemnification or advancement 
had any part in drafting them – many types of extrinsic 
                                              
6
 Goldman urges us to use “undisputed background 
facts” in aid of finding the term’s plain meaning.  But we 
cannot use these undisputed background facts here.  The 
evidence held out as “undisputed background facts” regarding 
title inflation relates to the term vice president, not officer, so 
we cannot use it in analyzing officer for ambiguity.  We 
cannot use evidence held out as “undisputed background 
facts” regarding the appointment process for officers at 
GSCo, because there are genuine issues of material fact 
regarding whether that process should be considered for 
determining who an officer is at GSCo.   
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evidence in this case would be irrelevant.  “[U]nless extrinsic 
evidence can speak to the intent of all parties to a contract, it 
provides an incomplete guide with which to interpret 
contractual language.”  SI Mgmt. L.P. v. Wininger, 707 A.2d 
37, 43 (Del. 1998) (emphasis in original).  “[A]lthough 
advancement provisions in corporate instruments often are of 
less than ideal clarity, rarely is resort to parol evidence 
appropriate or even helpful, as corporate instruments 
addressing advancement rights are often crafted without the 
involvement of the parties who later seek advancement.”  
DeLucca, 2006 WL 224058, at *6.  However, as we discuss 
below, it is inappropriate to apply the doctrine of contra 
proferentem and construe the ambiguities against the 
unilateral drafter, because we are considering whether 
Aleynikov can even claim status as a party benefited under 
the By-Laws.  So we are left in a bind:  most extrinsic 
evidence should not be considered because Goldman 
unilaterally drafted the By-Laws, yet we should not construe 
ambiguities against Goldman because we are trying to 
determine if Aleynikov even is a party to the contract.   
 We conclude that there are two types of extrinsic 
evidence that are relevant to resolving the ambiguity 
presented here:  “course of dealing” evidence and “trade 
usage” evidence.  Eagle Indus., 702 A.2d at 1233.  These 
types of extrinsic evidence go beyond the subjective intent of 
the drafting party to shed light on how reasonable individuals 
in the investment banking industry and at GSCo specifically 
would have interpreted the term officer.  The parties have 
introduced three categories of extrinsic evidence that we may 
properly consider as evidence of course of dealing and trade 
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usage.
7
  Evidence of GSCo’s procedure for appointing 
officers and of GSCo’s record of providing indemnification 
and/or advancement can properly be viewed as evidence of 
GSCo’s course of dealing with the title officer and with 
awards of indemnification and advancement.  Evidence of 
title inflation in the investment banking industry and industry 
usage of the title of vice president can be viewed as evidence 
of trade usage of titles that may connote officer-status to 
people inside the investment banking industry.  We evaluate 
each type of extrinsic evidence to determine whether this 
evidence is relevant and helpful in resolving the ambiguity 
and whether there are genuine issues of material fact 
regarding this evidence that preclude summary judgment. 
 Goldman offered evidence from discovery regarding 
GSCo’s procedure for appointing and removing officers.  It 
produced eleven documents titled “Written Consent of the 
General Partner of Goldman, Sachs & Co.”  These documents 
appointed and/or removed individuals as officers of GSCo.  
Goldman also introduced evidence that the persons occupying 
the position of officer, as appointed in the documents, were 
                                              
7
 Aleynikov introduced evidence that he believed he 
was an officer of GSCo.  But he also admitted that he had 
never read the By-Laws or considered his right to 
indemnification and advancement before his arrest.  We do 
not consider this extrinsic evidence for two reasons.  First, it 
would not be appropriate to consider “self-serving parol 
evidence submitted by the parties, whose recollections as to 
the intended meaning of the agreements predictably differ.”  
MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 426 F.3d 204, 214 n.4 
(3d Cir. 2005).  Furthermore, as the District Court observed, 
“Aleynikov’s possession of rights does not necessarily 
depend on his prior awareness of them.”  App. 25.   
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publicly identified in regulatory filings.  
 In considering the interpretive value of this extrinsic 
evidence, the District Court erred in improperly weighing the 
evidence to neutralize the value of GSCo’s process for 
appointing officers.  See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (“[A]t the 
summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself 
to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter 
but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”).  
The District Court discounted the weight of the appointment 
procedure because Goldman did not point to a document that 
established or memorialized this procedure for appointing 
officers.  It also discounted the evidence about identifying 
officers in public filings, reasoning that the evidence 
suggested that the appointments had a regulatory purpose, 
which had no bearing on the meaning of officer for 
indemnification and advancement purposes.  Finally, it 
discounted the evidence because the Written Consents were 
labeled “confidential” and the appointment process was not 
widely disseminated to the GSCo employee population.  
While these considerations may indeed weigh on whether the 
appointment procedure deserves credence in interpreting the 
terms of the contract, this is a factual determination for the 
jury to decide.  The District Court erred in improperly 
weighing and discounting the value of this evidence. 
  Goldman introduced evidence about its record of 
providing indemnification and/or advancement to other 
individuals at GSCo.  Over a six year period, fifty-three 
people associated with GSCo were considered for 
advancement and/or indemnification.  Of these fifty-three, 
Goldman paid the attorney’s fees for fifty-one.  Aside from 
Aleynikov, Goldman refused to pay indemnification and/or 
advancement for one other person who sought it, also a GSCo 
vice president.  However, of the fifty-one whose fees 
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Goldman paid, fifteen were GSCo vice presidents.  Goldman 
put forward evidence suggesting that for at least some of 
these individuals, Goldman was invoking its discretion in 
agreeing to pay the fees, even if the individual was not 
necessarily entitled to indemnification or advancement under 
the By-Laws.   
 The District Court discounted this evidence as a post-
hoc characterization of the payment decisions and expressed 
doubt as to the discretionary nature of the payments, drawing 
particular attention to the fact that for some of these 
individuals, indemnification and advancement were clearly 
mandatory under the By-Laws.  We decline to discount this 
evidence for these reasons.  While for some of the 
individuals, indemnification and advancement would have 
been clearly due under the By-Laws, this does not preclude 
Goldman from first determining whether it wants to pay 
attorney’s fees, and then, if it decides it does not want to do 
so, determining whether it must.  While the characterization 
of these decisions as discretionary could diminish their 
relevance to interpreting the By-Laws, we leave that question 
to the District Court at trial.  Depending on how this evidence 
of Goldman’s “course of dealing” is presented, it could have 
some relevance to the meaning of the term officer.
8
  If the 
                                              
8
 The dissent contends that this “course of dealing” 
evidence does not speak to the mutual understanding of the 
contracting parties, and is therefore irrelevant.  We agree, to a 
certain extent, that this evidence could have no relevance.  
Nevertheless, we leave this question to the District Court to 
decide based upon the substance of the evidence and the 
manner in which it is presented. 
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District Court finds this evidence relevant and admissible, it 
is up to a jury to determine how these prior instances of 
indemnification and advancement bear on the meaning of the 
term officer at GSCo.   
 Goldman introduced “trade usage” evidence, which 
Aleynikov has not rebutted, from publications like The 
Economist and The Los Angeles Times and deposition 
testimony showing that title inflation in the financial services 
industry is prevalent and the title of vice president is not 
particularly meaningful.  See App. 465 (“[I]n the investment 
banking and brokerage industries, just about everyone is a 
                                                                                                     
If Goldman’s past decisions regarding indemnification 
and advancement are all characterized as discretionary, they 
would have no value in establishing Goldman’s course of 
dealing in providing indemnification and advancement under 
the By-Laws, which is the issue here.  But in the record before 
this Court, Goldman has not characterized all of its decisions 
as discretionary.  The evidence of some instances where 
Goldman advanced attorney’s fees as required under the By-
Laws, as opposed to in its discretion, could be relevant as 
course of dealing evidence.   
Similarly, the evidence regarding Goldman’s 
appointment procedure could have no relevance.  We are only 
presented with the Written Consents, which are marked as 
confidential.  If these Written Consents were not widely 
disseminated, and the individuals identified therein were not 
held out as officers to the employee population of GSCo, the 
evidence would be irrelevant.  But if instead, these 
individuals were known to the employee population as 
officers or the employee population knew of the appointment 
process, even if the Written Consents were not publicized, the 
evidence would be relevant. 
 28 
vice president . . . .”); App. 468 (“Almost everybody in 
banking from the receptionist upwards is a president of some 
sort.”); App. 470 (“[M]anagement titles such as senior vice 
president . . . have spread so widely that ‘in many cases being 
a vice president means nothing.’”).  The evidence tends to 
show that vice president is merely “a functional title, because 
it connotes a level of seniority between associate and 
managing director, and as distinguished from an officer title, 
which is somebody who’s appointed through the process.”  
App. 945. 
 The District Court discounted this evidence of title 
inflation and the industry understanding of the term vice 
president.  The District Court placed the burden of this 
inartfully-bestowed title on Goldman, penalizing Goldman for 
the industry’s profligacy in conferring the title of vice 
president.  The District Court also confusingly observed that 
“the folkways of the financial services industry are not 
necessarily determinative here,” App. 25, even though the 
norms of the relevant industry are properly considered 
extrinsic evidence, Eagle Industries, Inc., 702 A.2d at 1233, 
and are relevant to ambiguity, which considers how a 
reasonable person in the position of the parties would 
interpret the contract term, Kuhn Construction, Inc., 990 A.2d 
at 396.  We emphasize yet again that it is the meaning of the 
term officer – the term appearing in the By-Laws – that the 
extrinsic evidence must aid in interpreting.  But the industry 
usage of the term vice president is still relevant extrinsic 
evidence.  Aleynikov hangs his hat only on his vice president 
title in claiming entitlement to advancement, and industry 
usage of this term informs industry understanding of who 
qualifies as an officer, and in particular, whether a GSCo vice 
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president can be considered an officer.
9
   
 Goldman’s extrinsic evidence raises genuine issues of 
material fact.  “[W]here reasonable minds could differ as to 
                                              
9
 The dissent argues that due to the unilateral nature of 
a company’s governing document, there can be no relevant 
evidence regarding the mutual understanding of the 
agreement’s meaning.  We disagree.  Evidence of “trade 
usage” of the terms officer and vice president seems to us to 
be particularly relevant to the parties’ mutual understanding, 
as it addresses the reasonable expectations of employees at 
GSCo.   
Each industry has its idiosyncratic terms and titles, the 
meaning of which is widely known to members of the 
industry and the individual companies, but which suggest a 
different meaning to those on the outside.  Goldman has 
suggested that the term “vice president” falls into this 
category.  Therefore, evidence of title inflation in the 
financial services industry and evidence of GSCo employees’ 
views on the meaning of “officer” and “vice president” are 
particularly relevant to informing how a reasonable employee 
at GSCo would interpret the term officer in the By-Laws.   
Aleynikov is free to present his own evidence with 
respect to the meaning of this term at GSCo, which he did not 
do before this Court except to present his own subjective 
view.  The evidence presented to this Court strongly suggests 
that to the extent that Aleynikov understood himself to be an 
officer, this was unreasonable in the relevant industry, given 
the trade usage of the words “officer” and “vice president.”  
We stop short of making this determination, as it is a factual 
question to be resolved by a jury.  But such evidence of trade 
usage is surely relevant to shed light on the parties’ 
reasonable understanding of the terms of the agreement. 
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the contract’s meaning, a factual dispute results and the fact-
finder must consider admissible extrinsic evidence.  In those 
cases, summary judgment is improper.”  GMG Capital Invs., 
LLC v. Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 A.3d 776, 783 
(Del. 2012).  A jury must determine the interpretive value of 
Goldman’s extrinsic evidence in resolving the ambiguity in 
the By-Laws.  
3. 
 The District Court concluded that even if the term 
officer was ambiguous, the concept of contra proferentem 
would apply to resolve any ambiguities against the corporate 
drafter, here, Goldman.  The doctrine of contra proferentem 
is well established in Delaware contract law.  When one side 
of a contract was unilaterally responsible for the drafting, 
courts apply contra proferentem and construe ambiguous 
terms against the drafter.  Norton v. K-Sea Transp. Partners 
L.P., 67 A.3d 354, 360 (Del. 2013).   
 Goldman contends that we should not apply the 
doctrine of contra proferentem here because we are presented 
with the threshold question of whether a person was a party to 
or intended beneficiary of a corporate instrument.  Aleynikov 
argues that contra proferentem applies whenever one party 
has sole control over the drafting of the agreement and 
Delaware courts do not consider extrinsic evidence of a 
drafter’s intent when the agreement was not the product of 
bilateral negotiation. 
 We have found no Delaware case law specifically 
addressing whether contra proferentem can and should apply 
where there is ambiguity over whether a plaintiff is a party to 
or beneficiary of a contract.  Generally, the cases in which the 
Delaware courts have applied contra proferentem have 
concerned situations in which it was clear that the party 
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invoking the doctrine had rights under the agreement and the 
ambiguity went to the scope of those rights.  See e.g., Norton, 
67 A.3d at 360 (discussing contra proferentem in the context 
of a dispute involving a limited partnership agreement 
between limited partners, a general partner, and the board of 
directors).  In particular, the courts have applied the doctrine 
to construe an ambiguity in an insurance policy against the 
insurance company that drafted the policy where the policy-
holder – clearly a party to the agreement – had no role in 
drafting the ambiguous provision.  See e.g., Twin City Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Delaware Racing Ass’n, 840 A.2d 624, 630-31 
(Del. 2003) (applying contra proferentem to construe an 
ambiguity in an insurance policy’s exclusion provision 
against the insurance company where the insured had no role 
in drafting the exclusion). 
 While we have found no case law directly on point, a 
close reading of the applicable Delaware case law suggests 
that the doctrine is inapplicable here.  The Delaware Court of 
Chancery has written that contra proferentem “protects the 
reasonable expectations of people who join a partnership or 
other entity after it was formed and must rely on the face of 
the operating agreement to understand their rights and 
obligations when making the decision to join.”  Stockman v. 
Heartland Indus. Partners, L.P., Nos. 4227-VSC, 4427-VCS, 
2009 WL 2096213, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 14, 2009) (emphasis 
added).  This language suggests that contra proferentem 
applies to determine the scope of a person’s rights under a 
contract which they had no role in drafting; it does not 
suggest that the doctrine applies to determine whether a 
person has rights and obligations under – i.e., whether he or 
she is a party to or beneficiary of – a contract. 
 “[T]he bylaws of a Delaware corporation constitute 
part of a binding broader contract among the directors, 
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officer, and stockholders formed within the statutory 
framework of the [Delaware General Corporation Law].”  
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 
934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013).
10
  Once it is determined whether or 
not a person qualifies as an officer under the By-Laws, contra 
proferentem might appropriately apply to resolve any 
ambiguities in the scope of the right to indemnification and 
advancement.  However, we conclude that contra 
proferentem has no application in resolving whether a person 
has rights under the contract at all – here, whether Aleynikov 
                                              
10
 The dissent criticizes our “reliance” upon this case 
because it does not concern contra proferentem.  We do not 
cite this case for contra proferentem principles, but rather as a 
statement of the parties to the By-Laws as a contract.  The 
proposition that by-laws are a contract among certain 
stakeholders is not novel or controversial.  See, e.g. Airgas, 
Inc. v. Air Prods. and Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182, 1188 (Del. 
2010) (“Corporate charters and bylaws are contracts among 
the corporation’s shareholders; therefore, our rules of contract 
interpretation apply.”).  We rely upon this case for the sole 
purpose of demonstrating that Aleynikov’s status as a party to 
the By-Laws is in question, because he has not established 
that he is a director, officer, or stockholder of Goldman. 
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is an officer of GSCo.
 11
  Applying the doctrine of contra 
proferentem in this circumstance would put the cart before the 
horse.  It would have us resolve ambiguities in favor of a non-
drafting individual in order to determine whether that non-
drafting individual was even subject to the agreement.  
 We therefore decline to apply the doctrine of contra 
proferentem and hold that the District Court erred in doing so.  
While resort to some types of extrinsic evidence specifically 
relating to Goldman’s intent might be inappropriate, as 
discussed above, resort to extrinsic evidence regarding course 
of dealing and trade usage to resolve the ambiguity does not 
seem inappropriate even where Goldman unilaterally drafted 
the agreement.  The use of course of dealing and trade usage 
evidence of the sort we discussed above “can speak to the 
intent of all parties to a contract,” SI Mgmt. L.P., 707 A.2d at 
43 (emphasis in original), as it addresses the general 
operations at GSCo and who reasonable people in the 
                                              
11
 The dissent maintains that we should apply contra 
proferentem to construe ambiguities in the By-Laws against 
Goldman because, among other reasons, doing so furthers the 
public policy of protecting the reasonable expectations of 
stakeholders who join an entity after the governing document 
has been drafted.  We note that this case does not implicate 
this public policy.  It is undisputed that Aleynikov did not 
review any part of the By-Laws before he began working at 
GSCo or during his time there.  App. 428.  Nor did Aleynikov 
expect that Goldman would pay his legal fees if he was sued 
or charged criminally; he admitted that the “thought never 
crossed [his] mind.”  App. 430.  Furthermore, as discussed in 
more detail in footnote 9, infra, consideration of trade usage 
extrinsic evidence protects the reasonable expectations of 
employees at GSCo.     
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investment banking industry would consider an officer to be.  
Absent consideration of Aleynikov’s subjective views on his 
officer-status, which would be neither helpful nor appropriate, 
this is the closest we can get to ascertaining how employees at 
GSCo, who may or may not be eligible for indemnification 
and advancement at some point, would view the language of 
the contract.  On remand, the fact finder should consider the 
extrinsic evidence presented and determine whether that 
evidence resolves the ambiguity to ascertain “which of the 
reasonable readings [of the term officer] was intended by the 
parties.”  Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. v. JCC Holding Co., 802 
A.2d 294, 309-10 (Del. Ch. 2002).    
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the District 
Court’s order granting summary judgment in Aleynikov’s 
favor on the advancement issue and remand to the District 
Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.  
Because we have concluded that the relevant terms of the By-
Laws are ambiguous and there are genuine issues of material 
fact raised in resolving that ambiguity, summary judgment is 
not appropriate for either party at this time.  Therefore, while 
we exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the District 
Court’s denial of Goldman’s cross-motion for summary 
judgment, we conclude that motion was properly denied and 
affirm the District Court on this issue.   
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FUENTES, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part.    
 
 I agree with the majority that the term “officer” as 
used in the advancement provision of the By-Laws is 
ambiguous.  But unlike the majority, I believe that Delaware 
has clearly stated the rule for deciding between competing 
interpretations of an ambiguous term: courts should construe 
the ambiguous term in the corporate instrument against the 
drafter, rather than inviting the use of extrinsic evidence to 
decipher the term’s meaning.  Delaware has never suggested 
that there is an exception to its contra proferentem rule where 
the ambiguity concerns “whether a plaintiff is a party to or 
beneficiary of a contract.”  Maj. Op. at 28.  Thus, I would 
resolve the ambiguous term “officer” against Goldman Sachs 
and conclude, as a matter of law, that Sergey Aleynikov, a 
vice president at Goldman, was an officer and therefore 
entitled to advanced legal fees.  I believe Delaware law 
compels this conclusion, as does the public policy animating 
Delaware’s interpretation of governing documents.     
 
 I therefore dissent. 
 
I. 
 
 Under Delaware law, a court generally must allow a 
case involving an ambiguous contract to proceed to trial, so 
that the finder of fact may “consider the relevant extrinsic 
evidence in aid of identifying which of the reasonable 
readings was intended by the parties.”  Harrah’s Entm’t, Inc. 
v. JCC Holding Co., 802 A.2d 294, 309 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(citing Eagle Indus. v. DeVilbiss Health Care, Inc., 702 A.2d 
1228, 1232 (Del. 1997)).  However, Delaware follows a 
different rule where the ambiguous contract at issue is a 
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firm’s governing document.  Stockman v. Heartland Indus. 
Partners, LLP, 2009 WL 2096213, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 14, 
2009).  Where such a governing document “makes promises 
to parties who did not participate in negotiating the 
agreement, Delaware applies the general principle of contra 
proferentem,” and construes ambiguous provisions against the 
drafter without resorting to extrinsic evidence.  Id.; see also 
SI Mgmt. L.P. v. Wininger, 707 A.2d 37, 42-44 (Del. 1998) 
(applying contra proferentem when interpreting a partnership 
agreement); Shiftan v. Morgan Joseph Holdings, Inc., 57 
A.3d 928, 935 (Del. Ch. 2012) (applying contra proferentem 
when interpreting a certificate of incorporation). 
 
 This rule applies where the ambiguous provision at 
issue concerns advancement.
1
  See Stockman, 2009 WL 
2096213, at *5; DeLucca v. KKAT Mgmt., L.L.C., 2006 WL 
224058, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 23, 2006).  Indeed, if anything, 
Delaware’s impulse to construe governing instruments 
against their drafters applies with greater force to 
advancement provisions, because “Delaware has a strong 
public policy in favor of [advancement].”  Id. at *7; see also 
Homestore, Inc, 888 A.2d at 211 (Del. 2005). 
 
                                              
1
 Advancement is related to, but distinct from, 
indemnification.  Indemnification provides reimbursement of 
legal expenses incurred by corporate officials in legal 
proceedings, while “[a]dvancement provides corporate 
officials with immediate interim relief from the personal out-
of-pocket financial burden of paying the significant on-going 
expenses inevitably involved with investigations and legal 
proceedings.”  Homestore, Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d 204, 211 
(Del. 2005). 
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 Goldman’s By-Laws “make[] promises [of 
advancement] to parties who did not participate in negotiating 
the agreement.”  See Stockman, 2009 WL 2096213, at *5.  
Under Delaware law, then, Goldman must clearly notify its 
employees whether they are entitled to advancement under its 
By-Laws.  See id.  As the majority explains, Goldman has 
failed to do so.  See Maj. Op. at 21.  It has drafted an 
advancement provision susceptible to more than one 
interpretation.  Accordingly, Delaware law requires us to 
apply the doctrine of contra proferentem and construe the 
provision against Goldman.   
 
II. 
 
 The majority has declined to apply Delaware’s contra 
proferentem doctrine to the advancement provision of the By-
Laws, because, it says, this dispute concerns whether 
Aleynikov is entitled to benefits under the By-Laws and not 
what those benefits include.  The majority draws this 
distinction from its survey of Delaware cases: they apply 
contra proferentem to ambiguities as to the scope of a 
particular benefit, but are silent as to whether contra 
proferentem applies to ambiguities concerning an individual’s 
entitlement to the benefit at all.   
 
 But the fact that Delaware has not applied contra 
proferentem in this exact circumstance does not mean that it 
would not do so were it given the opportunity.  And given the 
clear language in Delaware case law stating that contra 
proferentem applies to ambiguous provisions of governing 
documents, I believe that it is not appropriate to craft an 
exception to Delaware’s rule, unless the public policies 
motivating the rule are inapplicable to these circumstances.  
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In my view, however, the policies supporting Delaware’s use 
of contra proferentem would plainly be furthered by applying 
the doctrine to this case.  Specifically, construing the 
advancement provision against Goldman would (1) assure 
relevant stakeholders that they could reasonably rely on the 
face of governing documents of Delaware corporations, and 
(2) encourage Goldman to redraft the advancement provision 
in its By-Laws. 
 
A. 
 
 Generally speaking, persons working for, and 
contracting with, a firm do not take part in the drafting of the 
document that creates the firm and governs its conduct.  
Rather, these persons and entitled—referred to here as the 
firm’s stakeholders—conduct business with the firm after the 
governing document is drafted, and they must then decide 
whether to interact with the company based upon the 
representations of a unilaterally drafted document.  See 
Stockman, 2009 WL 2096213, at *5 (noting that a firm’s 
stakeholders “look to the governing instrument’s words” 
when determining whether to engage with a company); see 
also Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Commerzbank Capital Funding 
Trust II, 65 A.3d 539, 551 (Del. 2013).  Delaware’s robust 
application of contra proferentem accounts for this reliance 
interest by “protect[ing] the reasonable expectations of people 
who join a partnership or other entity after it was formed and 
must rely on the face of the operating agreement to 
understand their rights and obligations when making the 
decision to join.”  Stockman, 2009 WL 2096213, at *5.  This 
“in turn benefits the entity by encouraging [stakeholders] to 
provide their capital, be it human or financial, at a lower cost 
than they would if they faced greater uncertainty.”  Id. at *8.   
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 By rejecting the District Court’s application of contra 
proferentem, we open the door for the finder of fact to 
determine a governing document’s meaning using extrinsic 
evidence.  But as the Delaware Chancery Court has noted, 
looking to extrinsic evidence to make sense of these 
documents, rather than construing them against their drafters 
as a matter of law, contravenes the public policy outlined 
above.  Specifically, doing so “undermine[s] the ability of 
investors, officers, and other relevant constituencies to rely on 
the written text of governing instruments in deciding whether 
to invest in, work for, or supply debt capital to entities.”  Id. 
at *5.  Such an outcome is bad for that firm’s employees, its 
investors, and its shareholders.   
 
 The reasonable expectation of a vice president that he 
is an officer of a corporation (and is entitled to the benefits 
provided for in the By-Laws) is the very sort of expectation 
that Delaware corporate law clearly protects.  Aleynikov 
“join[ed Goldman] . . . after it was formed” and “rel[ied] on 
the face of [its By-Laws]”—that is, a vague promise that he 
was an officer entitled to advancement—“to understand [his] 
rights and obligations when making the decision to join.”  See 
id.  Honoring this reasonable expectation would assure other 
stakeholders that they, too, may rely on governing documents 
when doing business with entities organized in Delaware.  
  
 By contrast, today’s majority opinion does not honor 
Aleynikov’s reasonable expectations about the meaning of 
Goldman’s By-Laws.  In fact, as I explain below, it privileges 
the subjective views of Goldman about the meaning of the 
term “officer” over the reasonable expectations of its 
employees.  Doing so “undermine[s] the ability of . . . 
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relevant constituencies to rely on the written text of governing 
instruments in deciding whether to invest in, work for, or 
supply debt capital to entities.”  See id.   
 
B. 
 
 Delaware’s application of contra proferentem serves 
another, related public policy: it encourages corporations to 
draft clear corporate instruments and ensures that “governing 
instruments of entities [are] interpreted consistently and that 
they [are] applied in a predictable manner.”  Stockman, 2009 
WL 2096213, at *5; accord Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146, 1149-50 (Del. 1997) (noting that it 
is incumbent on an issuer of securities to make the terms of 
its operative documents clear to a reasonable investor).  By 
contrast, resorting to extrinsic evidence in construing 
ambiguous corporate instruments, as the majority does, 
“create[s] unpredictable results [and] reduce[s] the incentives 
for clear drafting.”  Stockman, 2009 WL 2096213, at *5. 
 
 By construing the advancement provision against 
Goldman, we would incentivize Goldman to rewrite the 
provision, so that it unambiguously states which of its 
employees are officers.  But today’s ruling encourages 
Goldman to do the opposite: keep the ambiguous language in 
place, thereby giving many persons the reasonable 
expectations they will receive advancement, while reserving 
the right to make unpredictable post hoc determinations about 
which former employees should be advanced attorney’s fees 
and which shouldn’t.  Such an outcome is inconsistent with 
Delaware law. 
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III. 
 
 Aside from contravening Delaware’s public policy, the 
majority’s decision also misapplies Delaware’s decisional 
law.  The majority suggests that Delaware’s contra 
proferentem doctrine applies only in resolving the scope of 
rights promised by a governing agreement, but that it “has no 
application in resolving whether a person has rights under the 
contract at all.”  Maj. Op. at 30.  This is so, the majority 
states, because “‘[t]he bylaws of a Delaware corporation 
constitute part of a binding broader contract among the 
directors, officers, and stockholders.’”  Id. at 29 (quoting 
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund. v. Chevron Corp., 73 
A.3d 934, 939 (Del. Ch. 2013)).  In other words, the majority 
appears to suggest that, under Delaware law, one is entitled to 
the protections of contra proferentem only where the plaintiff 
is definitely a director, officer, or shareholder, but not where 
his membership in one of these groups is in question. 
 
 There are several problems with this position.  First, 
Boilermakers Local 154, the case relied on by the majority, 
does not concern contra proferentem.  It says nothing at all 
about when that doctrine applies to the interpretation of a 
firm’s governing document. 
 
 Second, Delaware case law contradicts the notion that 
a corporate instrument is construed against the drafter only 
where the plaintiff is indisputably a shareholder, officer, or 
directors.  Indeed, the Chancery Court has explained that 
contra proferentem protects all persons or entities “who 
provide benefits to the entity” and who “rely on [the 
governing document] in making their decisions about whether 
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to participate in the entity’s activities.” Stockman, 2009 WL 
2096213, at *8.  The Delaware Courts believe that ensuring 
all relevant stakeholders that they can rely on their reasonable 
expectations about the meaning of governing instruments is 
essential to the existence of a smoothly running marketplace.  
As an employee, Aleynikov was entitled to rely on promises 
made to him in the By-Laws.  See id. at *5 (noting that the 
“concerns” motivating Delaware’s robust application of 
contra proferentem in this context are “equally applicable to 
the directors, officers, and employees” of an organization); 
see also 8 Del. C. § 109(b) (providing that a corporation’s by-
laws may contain provisions relating to “the rights or powers 
of,” among others its “employees”).  
 
 Third, the majority does not explain why Delaware 
would apply contra proferentem where a governing document 
is vague as to the benefit’s scope, yet would not apply the 
doctrine where the document is vague as to who receives it.  
As I note above, applying the doctrine in both contexts 
furthers Delaware public policy by encouraging clearer 
drafting, and by protecting the reasonable expectations of the 
relevant stakeholders.  
 
 In short, neither Delaware case law, nor Delaware 
public policy, favors the exception to Delaware’s contra 
proferentem doctrine set forth by the majority.  I therefore 
believe that we are obliged to apply contra proferentem here, 
and construe the advancement provision of the By-Laws 
against Goldman. 
 
IV. 
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 Today’s ruling sanctions the consideration of two 
categories of so-called “course of dealing” evidence: (1) 
evidence that Goldman invoked its discretion in agreeing to 
pay the legal fees of individuals in similar positions to 
Aleynikov; and (2) internal Goldman documents that 
“appointed and/or removed individuals as officers of GSCo,” 
as well as “evidence that the persons occupying the positions 
of officer, as appointed in the documents, were publicly 
identified in regulatory filings.”  Maj. Op. at 24.  This 
evidence does not speak to the mutual understanding of the 
contracting parties.  I therefore believe it is irrelevant and 
cannot be considered by the finder of fact. 
 
 In Delaware, “[t]he goal in reviewing the extrinsic 
evidence is to determine if there is a meaning of the [contract] 
such that an ‘objectively reasonable party in the position of 
either bargainer would have understood the nature of the 
contractual rights and duties to be.’”  KFC Nat’l Council & 
Adver. Co-op., Inc. v. KFC Corp., 2011 WL 350415, at *15 
(Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2011) (emphasis added); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, § 223(1) (explaining that 
admissible “course of dealing” evidence concerns “a 
sequence of previous conduct between the parties to an 
agreement which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a 
common basis of understanding for interpreting their 
expressions and other conduct” (emphasis added)).   
 
 By contrast, evidence that goes only to the subjective 
belief of one of the contracting parties about the meaning of 
the contract is irrelevant.  See In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 
789 A.2d 14, 55 (Del. Ch. 2001).  As I explain above, rarely 
does an individual employed by, or investing in, a firm take 
part in the drafting of its governing document.  Accordingly, 
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where a person’s rights under a firm’s governing agreement 
are at issue, there is no meeting of the minds as to the 
document’s meaning.  And by extension, of course, there can 
be no relevant evidence concerning the parties’ mutual 
understanding of the agreement’s meaning.  See, e.g., Bank of 
N.Y. Mellon, 65 A.3d at 551 (in interpreting limited liability 
company agreement, extrinsic evidence “yield[s] information 
about the views and position of only one side of the dispute,” 
and is therefore “unhelpful” in deciphering the contract’s 
meaning); Kaiser Aluminum Corp. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 
397 (Del. 1996) (consideration of extrinsic evidence to 
discern meaning of certificate of designation was 
inappropriate). 
 
 At best, the evidence that Goldman invoked its 
discretion when providing legal fees to some of its former 
employees demonstrates the sincerity of Goldman’s 
subjective belief that it is not required to indemnify and 
advance fees to vice presidents under the By-Laws.  This 
evidence says nothing at all about Aleynikov’s reasonable 
expectation that he would receive advancement and 
indemnification when he joined Goldman.  Neither the 
majority nor Goldman has suggested that Aleynikov knew, 
when he began working for Goldman, that Goldman believed 
it had the discretion to provide attorney’s fees to vice 
presidents.   
 
 The same goes for the evidence that Goldman 
appointed its officers by formal resolution.  There is no 
evidence that Aleynikov knew of these internal documents or 
regulatory filings when he joined the firm.  Nor, I assume, is 
the majority suggesting that Aleynikov had a duty to scour 
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Goldman’s regulatory filings to understand the scope of his 
benefits.    
 
 Both categories of evidence, then, speak only to 
Goldman’s views about what it means to be an officer in its 
organization.  Neither category speaks to what both sides’ 
expectations were when entering into the contract.  Thus, the 
evidence is “unhelpful” in divining the meaning of the 
advancement provision of the By-Laws.  See Bank of N.Y. 
Mellon, 65 A.3d at 551.  Worse, by allowing the finder of fact 
to consider evidence of Goldman’s subjective belief about the 
meaning of its poorly drafted advancement provision, we 
privilege Goldman’s unilateral view about what its By-Laws 
mean over the reasonable expectations of its employee.  As I 
explain above, this contravenes Delaware public policy, 
which resolutely protects the reasonable expectations of 
persons interacting with Delaware corporations.  Stockman, 
2009 WL 2096213, at *5.   
 
 The majority’s rationale for using this evidence is that 
the majority is “left in a bind” after declining to apply contra 
proferentem.  Maj. Op. at 23.  To be sure, declining to use 
contra proferentem where a contract is unilaterally drafted 
leaves us with no satisfactory mechanism to determine the 
meaning of the governing agreement.  That is why we should 
apply Delaware’s rule of interpretation to construe ambiguous 
provision of the By-Laws against Goldman.   
 
V. 
 
 In sum, I would construe the advancement provision of 
the By-Laws against Goldman.  The distinction drawn by the 
majority not only lacks any basis in Delaware law, it also 
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lacks any clear policy rationale.  In fact, Delaware public 
policy would be benefited by construing the advancement 
provision in the By-Laws against Goldman. Moreover, by 
declining to use contra proferentem, the majority has invited 
the use of improper extrinsic evidence to determining what 
the parties meant.  For these reasons, we should conclude that 
Aleynikov is an officer under the By-Laws and is entitled to 
advancement of his legal fees from Goldman.  
 
 I therefore respectfully dissent.  
